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IN THI: SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT ALEX VALDEZ, 
Defendant-Apnellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 15920 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Robert Alex Valdez, appeals from a 
judgment and conviction on jury trial of the crime of negligent 
homicide in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION HELOW 
The appellant was arrested and charged with second 
degree murder in violation of 76-5-203, U.C.A. 1953. After 
preliminary hearing he was held for trial and charged by 
infor!'lation with second dee;ree I!!Urder. Jury trial was held 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District on 
June 12, 1978. The jury returned a verdict on June 14, 1978 
of guilty of the lesser included offense of negligent homicide. 
The appellant was sentenced on June 15, 1978, to serve one 
year in the Salt Lake Count" Jail. This appeal was taken 
on June 23, 1978, from the iudgrnent imposed. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's iud?,ment 
and a new trial. 
STATDlEllT OF FACTS 
The appellant was charged and nrosecuted for the crime 
of second degree murder of Melvin Gregory Miller. (R. 10) ThE 
prosecution alleged that the appellant shot Miller on the llti 
day of December, 1977, in Salt Lake County. At the tioe of 
trial, there was no dispute that the appellant in fact shot 
Miller. The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser 
included offense of negligent homicide and the appellant was 
sentenced to be committed to the Salt Lake County Jail for 
one year. (R. 70, 74). 
Debbie Valdez, the daughter of the appellant, (R. 128-
129) .. ~c "'~:: J.iving with her father and mother, but at 4:00 a. 
on 0ecemoer 11, 1977, entered their home, took a set of auto-
mobile keys and drove off alone in her father's car. (R. 129) 
Debbie was 15 years of age and had been going with the 
deceased, Melvin Miller, for approximately two years. (R. 138) 
She was residing in a motel at the time the offense occurred. 
(R. 138) She admitted having given her parents a bad time ani 
had been in the detention home and the Utah State Hospital. 
(R. 138-139) The deceased was approximately 25 vears of age a 
rumored to be married. (R. 251, 252) The appellant, Robert 
Valdez, had never seen or met Miller although he had heard t~ 
his daughter, Debbie, was going with :Hiller. (R. 252) Robert 
Valdez had been advised by a police officer on the Salt Lake ( 
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Police Department, Detective Green, that Debbie had been hanging 
around with the worst kind of people and that Miller had a 
criminal record. (R. 233) On the morning of December ll, 1977, 
Robert Valdez noticed his vehicle had been taken by someone. 
(R. 237) He believed that Debbie had taken the car because the 
car was gone and he had not heard his dog bark. (R. 238) Valdez 
had a gun that he purchased 1;-rhile he v1as working part time with 
Webb Se· 'rity as a security guard. (R. 229) He got the gun from 
the closet and put two bullets in it that a friend had given him. 
(R. 238) He did not have Miller in mind \vhen 1-J.e got his gun, 
but intended to scare Debbie to try to get her to go straight. 
(R. 237, 238) Valdez in the company of his brother-in-law, 
Billmen LeFevre, went in the latter's vehicle to try and find 
Valdez' car. The vehicle was spotted in the vicinity of North 
Temple and Third ~Vest at approximately 10:40 a.m. (R. 109, 129) 
When Valdez spotted the car, he only observed the driver, Melvin 
Miller, a black man. (R. 241) He started towards the car when 
his brother-in-law said, "That's not Debbie". He told Miller to 
get out of the car and to walk back in the direction of the car 
that Valdez and LeFevre had been riding in. Valdez grabbed 
Miller by the shoulder and told him to lean on the car and then 
looked back and saw that Debbie was in the Valdez car of which 
Miller had gotten out. (R. 242, 245) Valdez was looking at 
Debbie when the gun went off. (R. 243) Valdez testified he 
didn't go to kill Miller and he didn't recall if Hiller had hit 
his gun before the shot was fired. (R. 245) He indicated that 
his brother-in-law may have called out for him to watch out for 
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Miller. (R. 246) Other witnesses to the incident testified tl 
Miller, in fact, struck the gun or tapped it just before it ~ 
off. Debbie Valdez testified that immediately before the shot 
Melvin "chopped the gun" (R. 125) and had testified at prelim. 
inary hearing that he hit the gun. (R. 172) Janet Klindt, a 
bystander in another vehicle, said that she observed the incic 
that the black man who had been driving the car got out when 
Valdez was holding a gun, that they walked back towards the c1 
and she saw the black man fall and she saw Debbie Valctez driv€ 
away in the car. (R. 111, 113) This was corroborated by the 
driver of the vehicle in which Janet Klindt was a passenger. 
(R. ll9, 126) Billmen LeFevre testified that he saw Miller af 
he got out of the car reach out like he was going to get some· 
thing, that he shouted to Valdez "Hatch out, I think he's goir 
to pull something out" and that Hiller then hit the gun which 
went off and Hiller fell on the car. (R. 219, 220) After the 
shooting, Valdez told LeFevre to call the police. (R. 220, 2~ 
The Valdez vehicle had been reported stolen to the police by 
Robert Valdez' wife. (R. 257) Police officers had received< 
call concerning the stolen vehicle immediately before going t1 
the scene of the shooting. (R. 187) Valdez remained at the ~ 
and advised the officer who arrived of the fact of the shooti: 
(R. 175). 
The bullet that killed Hiller entered in the side of his 
head at a rising angle and was expended and came to rest in t' 
hatband of the deceased. (R. 152, 161, 178) Police examinati: 
of the weapon showed that it contained only two bullets, one 
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which had been fired. (R. 179) Valdez' statement to the police 
at the scene was that he had been looking for the person who 
stole his car, had gotten the ~river who was in his car out of 
the vehicle and had the gun out and then "didn't know what 
happened." (R. 182) This was consistent with his testimony at 
the time of trial. (R. 244, 246) The appellant's statement to 
Officer Pat Smith who interrogated him following the shooting was 
that he had not seen Miller before the shooting, although he 
knew of him through Detective Green and that the gun went off 
when he was pushing Miller on the car. He indicated he took the 
gun to scare Debbie. (R. 269, 273). It was Robert Valdez' 
contention, at the time of trial, as corroborated by other 
witnesses that the gun went off after Miller had been removed 
from the vehicle and that he did not inte~i r~ shoot Miller 
but the killing was an accident. 
At the time of trial, defense counsel requested the court to 
instruct the jury to the effect that Valdez had a right to use 
non-deadly force to terminate criminal interference with his 
property. (R. 37) The trial court denied the defendant's 
requested instruction which was to the effect that a person 
was justified in using force other than deadly force when 
necessary to terminate criminal interference with his property. 
(R. 38) In addition, the trial court gave an instruction on 
negligent homicide (R. 56, 65) and on accident (R. 59). The 
instruction on accident (R. 59) advised the jury that the killing 
was excusable if the defendant "acted with ,., ,., ,., ordinary care 
and caution which would be exercised by the ordinary careful and 
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d . 'd 1 act;ng under like circumstances " However. prudent in ~v~ ua ~ 
the court's instructions to the jury on negligent ho~icide w~ 
in accord with the provisions of 76-5-206 and 76-2-103(4), U~ 
Code Annotated, 1953, defining criminal negligence. That 
standard given the jury was that in order to convict "a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person we 
exercise" was required. The appellant's counsel took excentic 
to the failure to give the requested instructions on appellaru 
right to use force to terminate interference with his propert' 
(R. 283) 
The jury returned a verdict of negligent homicide. 
ARG1J11ENT 
POINT I 
~l·H: TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
t:I\Y ON THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO USE FORCE TO 
jEFJUNATE I~TERFERENCE IJITH HIS PROPERTY. 
At the time of trial, counsel for the appellant requeste1 
the judge to instruct the jury that a person could use force 
other than deadly force in order to terminate criminal inter-
ference with the possession of his personal property. The tr 
court declined to give such an instruction. (R. 37,38) It is 
submitted that under the appellant's theory of the case s•1ch: 
instruction was proper. The facts disclosed that Robert Valdi 
vehicle was taken from his premises early on the morning of 
December 11, 1977. Because of the manner in which the vehicli 
was taken, Valdez believed that ~ebbie Valdez, his daughter,: 
have taken the vehicle. He sought to recover the vehicle wl-Ji: 
he believed was probably in the vicinitv. In the company of 
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l'rother-in-Ll\·1, BillPJen LeFevre, he cormnenced to look for the 
eRr. lie had previouslv taken a weapon for the purposes of 
scaring Debbie Valdez. ~Jhen he observed his vehicle it was not 
being driven by his daughter but by another person whom he had 
not given permission to take or use his vehicle. At the time 
that the victim, lfelvin tliller, was operating the vehicle he knew 
that it had been taken without permission from Valdez. (R. 142) 
Hiller, upon being told that Robert Valdez had spotted the car, 
thought that he and Debbie could still get away if the light 
changed. (R. 143). Miller's action under these circumstances was 
felonious. § 41-1-112, Utah Code Ann. 1953. Cf. State v. Levin, 
587 P.2d 124 (Utah 1978). Valdez approached Miller according to 
his testimony only with a view towards getting his vehicle back 
and did not at any time intend to use deadly force. Valdez had 
Miller get out of the vehicle and move to the rear towards the 
other vehicle. At that point Valdez saw Debbie, his daughter, 
and was looking at her when the gun went off. Other witnesses 
indicated that Miller struck out at the gun just before it went 
off. !he jury's finding of negligent homicide suPports the 
conclusion that the jury believed that Valdez did not intend to 
kill Melvin Miller and that the death was the result of Valdez' 
negligence. It in effect was the appellant's Position that the 
gun went off unintentionally. The jury was called upon to 
determine under the negligent homicide standard whether the 
appellant had been "criminally negligent". § 76-5-206, Utah Code 
Ann. 1953. In order to find the appellant criminally negligent, 
1 !t<- jun· had to '"eigh whether the conduct of Valdez under the 
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circumstances constituted "a Gross deviation from the standari 
care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circu~ 
stances if viewed from the actor's standpoint." In ~aking t~ 
determination as to whether Valdez' conduct was criminally 
negligent or not, the question of whether Valdez had a right t 
use force to terminate Miller's interference with Valdez' 
property was a legitimate consideration. If Valdez had no sw 
authority then the use of force could be deemed a gross devi~ 
from the conduct of an ordinary person under the circumstance' 
If he had a right to threaten the use of force his action in 
having the weapon could be non-negligent or mere simple negli· 
gence. There is nothing inconsistent between the defense pos' 
that the gun went of~ by accident and the right to use force: 
ter~i~ate interference with one's property. In State v. Mit~ 
56" .:_20 (Utah 1977), the defendant was charged with mun 
in the second degree. This Court reversed a conviction becaui 
of a failure to instruct as to the right of the defendant toi 
in defense of his habitation. In response to the contentiont 
such a defense is inconsistent with accident, this Court staU 
"It is our judgment that the position of the 
defendant: that he was defending what he regarded 
as his habitation, is not necessarily inconsistent 
with his assertion that the discharge of the gun 
and the striking of the deceased in the neck was 
~n acc~dent. Furthermore, even if they were 
lnconslstent, that should not deprive the defendant 
of either defense. 
In a_criminal case the defendant need not s~ecially 
plead hls defenses. The entry of a plea of not guilty 
places upon the State the burden of nroving every 
el~men~ of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Thls glves the defendant the benefit of everv defense 
thereto which may cause a reasonable doubt to exist 
as to his guilt, arising either from the evidence, 
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or lack of evidence, in the case; and this is true 
whether his defenses are consisten or not. 
On the basis of what has been said herein it is 
our opinion that if the requested instructio~ had 
been ~iven and the jurv had so considered the 
evidence, there is reasonable likelihood that it 
may have had some effect upon the verdict rendered. 
Therefore the defendant's request should have been 
granted." 
The above case would support the proposition that the defendant 
had a right to have submitted to the iury his claim that he had a 
right to use force to retake his property or effect an arrest 
or in the alternative the killing was an accident. The jury 
was entitled to know that the defenses were not necessarily 
inconsistent with one another. 
76-2-406, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides: 
"A person is justified in using force, other 
than deadly force, against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that force 
is necessary to prevent or terminate criminal 
interference with real property or personal 
property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; ... " 
It is well established that the lawful owner or possessor 
of property may use reasonable force, other than deadly force, 
to protect his chattel property. In Clark & Marshall, Crimes, 
7th Ed. p. 500, it is observect: 
"1-Jhile a person cannot take another's life or 
inflict great bodily harm in defense of his property, 
except when it is necessary to prevent a felony 
attempted by violence or surprise, he may use any 
force short of this that may reasonably seem to be 
necessary in defense of his property, real or personal." 
In LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, p. 399, it is stated: 
"One is justified in usin?c; reasonable force to 
protect his property from . . . theft,. whe;n he 
reasonablv believes that his property 1s 1n 
immediate. danger of such an unlawful interference 
and that the use of such force is necessary to 
avoid that danger." 
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The motor vehicle in question was lawfully in the possession· 
Robert Valdez prior to the action of the victi~ and Valdez' 
daughter in interfering with his possession. He therefore hr 
right to use non-deadly force to terminate their interference 
with the vehicle. Further, the mere fact that Robert Valdez: 
in his possession a gun and threatened by its display l1elvin 
Miller did not constitute the use of deadly force. He did n~ 
use deadly force until the gun went off. Before then, he mer: 
threatened such force. Robert Valdez had a right to threaten 
use of deadly force but not the right to use it. Valdez had 
been told Helvin Miller Y.'aS a criminal type and a bad person. 
In Perkins on Criminal Law, Second Edition, P. 1028, it is st 
"Hisely or umvisely the law tolerates a bluff 
which it would not permit to be carried out, and 
in a case in which D drew a knife which he 
threatened to use, but did not use, in defense 
of his property a conviction of assault was 
:"eversed on the ground that a threat to use a 
weapon may be privileged when its actual use 
would not be." 
Other authorities recognize the difference between the right 
use deadly force and the right to threaten its use. The 
Restatement of Torts, Second§ 81(2) provides: 
"The actor is privileged in defense of his . . . 
chattels against intrusion to do an act which is 
intended to put another in imoediate apprehension 
of a harmful or offensive contact or other bodilv 
harm or confinement which is in excess of that " 
whic~ t~e actor is privileged to inflict, if his 
act ~s ~ntended and reasonably believed by him to 
be l~kely to do no more than to create such appre-
hens~on." · · 
The same policy is also recognized as to self-defense. See 
Restatement of Torts, Second§ 70(2). 
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In Stale v. Yancey, 74 N.C. 244 (1876), the principle 
was recognized and applied in acquitting a defendant on assault 
charges in a dispute over the possession of a saddle. The 
defendant had brandished a knife and declared, "If you don't 
turn loose, I'll cut you loose." The Court stated: 
"This conduct of the prosecutor was not such as 
to justify an actual battery with the knife in the 
first instance, but the defendant had the right 
to do what was necessary to @ake the prosecutor 
let go his saddle, beginning with moderate force 
and increasing in the ratio of the assistance, 
without measuring it in golden scales. 
A threat to use a deadly weapon, with the power 
to do it, may often be justifiable, when a battery 
with the same would not be. And this is one of 
those cases." 
In State v. Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 186 Pac. 108 (1919), this 
Court reversed a conviction where the trial court failed to give 
proper instructions as to defendant's theory of the case in a 
defense of property situation. 
In the instant case, appellant does not contend that the 
facts require his acquittal. It is appellant's position that 
the jury should have been instructed that if they found that 
appellant was pursuing the victim to terminate the intrusion 
of the victim with appellant's property, that he was nrivileged 
to so act including threaten, as Valdez impliedly did, the use 
of deadly force. Such an instruction would have allowed the 
jury to find that the appellant was acting lawfully in doing 
what he did up until the time the gun went off. Such an 
instruction would have alloued and justified the jury in 
believing that the appellant's conduct, up until the gun 
,,·enr off, was not a "gross deviation from the standard of care 
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that an ordinary person would exercise." 76-2-103(4), Utah 
Code Ann. 1953. This was of major significance to the iurv 
as their verdict indicates. The jury could have found that 
Robert Valdez did not act unreasonably and that the weanon 
went off by simple negligence or without Valdez' fault. The 
instruction requested was therefore critical to appellant's 
theory of the case, was properly requested by appellant, and 
the failure to give it was prejudicial error. State v. Terre: 
supra; State v. Mitcheson, supra. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN GIVING 
INCONSISTENT INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCIDENT AND NEGLIGENT 
HOMICIDE. 
The trial judge instructed the jury in Instruction 17C OI 
excusable homicide by accident (R. 59). The instruction givei 
was as follm>Js: 
·:,,e killing of a human being in and of 





The trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included of 
of negligent homicide in Instruction 21. (R. 65) The trial 
court instructed the jury that to find the defendant guilty 
of negligent homicide they would have to find that the defen~ 
caused the death of rlelvin l{iller by engaging in conduct 1"hic 
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constitutes "criminal negligence". (R. 65) The court had 
previously defined criminal negligence as follows: (R. 56) 
"'\·lith criminal negligence' when he ought 
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the surrounding circumstances exist 
or the result will occur ... the risk must be 
of such a nature and degree that its disregard 
or failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise. . " 
The instructions on negligent homicide required a finding of 
gross negligence when viewed from the standpoint of the actor 
as required by 76-2-103(4) defining criminally negligent conduct. 
However, the instruction on accident, which is not based on 
anything in the current Utah Penal Code, advised the jury that 
the defendant could only be exonerated for the accidental killing 
of Miller if they found that he acted with "ordinary care and 
caution". Consequently, the instructions given by the court 
created a hiatus betvJeen gross negligence and no negligence. 
One standard to convict, one standard to acquit, and the two 
standards do not dovetail with one another. Thus, a hiatus 
existed in the instructions as given by the court. This is 
apparently because the instruction on accident appears to have 
been taken in part from the definition of excusable homicide by 
accident as it existed in the prior penal code. See 76-30-8, 
R.S. Utah 1898 § 4166. The instruction is not quite in accord 
with 76-30-8, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as it existed under the prior 
penal code which was replaced by the current code in 1973, 
76-1-102, Utah Code Ann., 1953, Laws of Utah 1973 Ch. 196. 
The prior code also defined the term "negligence" in terms 
of simple negligence, 76-1-3 (2), Utah Code Ann. 1953. Thus, the 
instruction on accident was compatible with the definition of 
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negligence under the prior code. However, the current code 
defines negligence in terms of "crir1inal negligence" and 
requires a gross deviation from the standard of care of an 
ordinary person. 76-2-103, Utah Code Ann. 1953. Any lesser 
standard of negligence, except for automobile homicide, is n[ 
criminally punishable. Compare, State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 
220, 364 P.2d 1019 (1961) with State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398 
(Utah 1977). The instruction given by the court on accident 
was therefore incompatible with the standard for conviction 
on negligent homicide which could only have confused the jup 
Thus, the jury could have believed that unless the defendant 
acted as a reasonable prudent man he was not entitled to acou: 
in spite of the instruction given by the court that to convi( 
negligent homicide required a higher standard. Thus, with thi 
nvo i-r,::,;->;oistent standards one is left to guess at what stand: 
thL ~' ~ight have applied. 
It is submitted that although no exception was taken to' 
instruction given on accident, that it was plain error to gi~ 
the instruction that was given. The current Utah penal code 
contains no provisions regarding excusable homicide but refer' 
generally to justification excluding criminal responsibility. 
See, Part 4, Title 76 Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. : 
standard that existed as to excusable homicide under the pri~ 
penal code is different than the standard under the current p, 
code· Criminal negligence under the prior penal code was def: 
in terms of simple negligence. Criminal negligence under the 
current penal code requires a higher level of culnability. f 
the instruction given by the court on accident created a disP 
of standards, was not in accord with the provisions of the 
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current pRnal code as to criminal negligence and constituted 
plain error. State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936). 
CONCLUSIOil 
It is respectfully submittec1. that the trial court committed 
reversible error. The defendant is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case if the evidence warrants it. 
In this case the evidence warranted an instruction to the jury 
that the appellant was justified in using force to terminate 
the criminal interference with his property. The court's 
refusal to so instruct could only have prevented the jury from 
proper consideration of whether appellant was criminally 
negligent. 
The court also committed prejudicial, plain error in 
giving an instruction on accident that was outside of current 
penal code and not compatible with the instruction given for 
negligent homicide. Prejudicial error was committed, this 
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